Estimates of the effect of wages on job satisfaction by Lydon, Reamonn & Chevalier, Arnaud
Abstract 
 
Empirical studies on job satisfaction have relied on two hypotheses:  firstly, that wages are 
exogenous in a job satisfaction regression and secondly, that appropriate measures of relative 
wage can be inferred.  In this paper we test both assumptions using two cohorts of UK 
university graduates.  We find that controlling for endogeneity, the direct wage effect on job 
satisfaction doubles.  Several variables relating to job match quality also impact on job 
satisfaction.  Graduates who get good degrees report higher levels of job satisfaction, as do 
graduates who spend a significant amount of time in job search.  Finally we show that future 
wage expectations and career aspirations have a significant effect on job satisfaction and 
provide better fit than some ad-hoc measures of relative wage. 
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  6), or an additively separable utility function, as suggested by
Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1997).
  	

The basic or static model involves the estimation of equation (1) above. Depending on
whether or not one wishes to look at relative income effects, the 

parameter may or may
not be constrained to zero, and initially, this is what we do. In this section we are particularly
interested in how the estimated parameters change when the assumption of weak exogeneity
of the wage variable is relaxed. For the purposes of this paper, however, we will maintain




For reasons of comparability between the non-IV results (where it is assumed that wages
are exogenous) and the IV results we only report the results here for our reduced sample
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12
. The other estimator, first derived by Amemiya
(1978), uses full information methods, jointly estimating the equations and making use of
the cross-equation correlations of the disturbances.
It is not a straight forward task to come up with a valid exclusion restriction that identifies
the true (unbiased) effect of wages on job satisfaction. This may partly explain why much
of the job satisfaction literature has overlooked the problem
13
. In this paper we propose to
use the characteristics of the respondent’s partner or spouse as instruments.
There are two main economic arguments for the use of the partner’s characteristics as
valid exclusion restrictions. The first relies on the assortative mating argument as discussed
in Becker (1973). We assume that individuals sort themselves into couples on the basis of
certain characteristics and some of these characteristics, such as age or education for ex-
ample, are positively correlated with wages and are observed, whereas others, which are
also correlated with wages, are not observed. The idea is that the partner’s characteristics
act as reasonable proxies for the presence of these unobserved characteristics in the respon-
dents
14
.A more direct channel through which a partner’s characteristics can contribute to
12
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the individual’s wage is through enhancing their effective stock of human capital (and hence
productivity and wages). The effect of partner’s characteristics on effective human capi-
tal was first investigated by Benham (1974). Individuals with exposure to partners with a
greater stock of human capital do, on average, benefit from such exposure.
The survey asks the respondents several questions about their respective spouse or part-
ner. We know their labour force status, wage, educational qualifications, and also whether
they work full-time or part-time. We focus on the partner’s wage as it also summarises the
other observed spouse’s characteristics. The results are as expected. The spouse’s wage has
a positive and highly significant effect on the wage (see Table 6 for the reduced form). As
noted in Cameron and Taber (2000), in general without a maintained assumption that the
instrument is valid it is impossible to test it. However, they recommend an analysis of the
relationship between the excluded variable and the observables in the job satisfaction equa-
tion. In Table 7 we present the regression of the log of spouse’s pay on various observables
from the job satisfaction equation. The results are encouraging in that we find few of the
significant variables from the job satisfaction equation to be correlated with the spouse’s
wage. Although this evidence is by no means conclusive, it reinforces the credentials of
spousal wage as an instrument for own wage.
We follow Newey’s approach (1987) to estimate the structural parameters from the job
satisfaction equation. This full information method draws on Amemiya’s generalised least
squares estimator (AGLS) (1978)
15
. The full set of parameters from estimating the job
satisfaction equation having instrumented for wages are presented in column (3) of Table 5.
The final row of Table 5 also reports the Blundell and Smith (1986) test for weak exogeneity of
the endogenous variable, wages. This is the coefficient on the residual from the reduced form
wage equation, and it clearly shows that we can reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity
of wages for the specification of job satisfaction used. Interestingly, these residuals are used





   







	 	 "%  ! "	







 	   	 
 























 - @( $		% 






















 *  A%  2!
9
equation. When instrumenting wages, most of the estimates remain similar to the exogenous
case but a stark increase in the impact of wages on job satisfaction is found. The wage
coefficient in a job satisfaction would be biased downwards when the assumption of weak
exogeneity is imposed. The coefficient remains significant and has increased more than
two-fold. The corresponding marginal effects are shown in Table 2a.
The new marginal effects are significantly larger than our previous estimates - the increase
in the probability of being satisfied following a wage increase of £10,000 is now almost
14 percentage points, more than double our previous estimate (Table 1). The negative
simultaneity bias affecting the wage parameter when wages are assumed to be exogenous is
indicative of model of wages as compensating differentials. That is, the wage effect on job
satisfaction would be biased downwards if people were more highly paid to take on more
dangerous or risky jobs. In this case, we could see well paid people reporting low levels of
job satisfaction. Introducing independent variation in wage by instrumenting, removes the
simultaneity bias.
Ideally, in order to test whether or not the simultaneity bias stems uniquely from com-
pensating differentials, we should estimate the entire system of equations instrumenting for
wages in the job satisfaction equation and job satisfaction in the wage equation. Unfortu-
nately, we could not find an appropriate set of instruments to estimate the latter equation.
As an alternative, we include dummy variables for individuals’ occupations in the job satis-
faction equation. If these dummies are perfectly capturing the occupation conditions, their
inclusion will lead to an unbiased estimate of the effect of wage on job satisfaction. Table
2b reports the coefficients on the wage in the job satisfaction equation when we include con-
trols for occupation. Columns (1) to (4) show how the wage effect changes when we include
two-digit occupation controls in the job satisfaction equation.
In both specifications, the wage effect on job satisfaction falls when controls for occupation
are included. This would imply that part of the wage effect on job satisfaction is indeed
a compensating differential story but that a significant proportion of the simultaneity bias




   
As Table 5 shows, apart from wages several other variables impact significantly on job satis-
faction. We discuss these characteristics under the heading of job match and job attributes.
One result is that individuals who do well in their studies, i.e. obtain first class qualifica-
tions, also turn out to be more satisfied with their jobs. The first row of Table 3 shows the
marginal effects when we change the class of the qualification from a lower second (or below)
to a first class degree. The large positive impact on job satisfaction from doing well in your
studies is comparable with the adjusted wage effects in Table 2a. One possible explanation
for this effect is that having a good degree is likely to be positively correlated with job match
quality. The relationship between job match and job satisfaction is well documented in the
literature, see Battu  	
 (1999), and it does not seem unreasonable to assume that those
graduates with a better degree are also more likely to have a better quality job match.
We also find a significant U-shape relationship between job satisfaction and the number of
months that the graduate is unemployed. The fact that job satisfaction is initially declining
and then increasing in months unemployed can be conveniently explained by appealing to
a job match story. The longer a graduate searches for a job and doesn’t find one, the more
likely he is to settle for a job that does not exactly match his skills, thereby affecting job
satisfaction. However, graduates who spend  longer searching for a job - i.e. those who
are very particular about choosing a career that matches their skills - have a high quality job
match and thus higher job satisfaction. Alternatively, the unemployment experience may
alter the graduates job expectations and upon finding a job, make him more satisfied with
his satisfaction   than a graduate who did not experience such a long spell of
unemployment.
Tables 3 and 5 show that job satisfaction is also decreasing in work hours. This is a
result found by Clark and Oswald (1996), and has its roots in the labour leisure trade-off
microeconomic theory. However, the assumption of weak exogeneity of the hours variable is
unlikely to be true, therefore we do not wish to over-emphasise this result. Job satisfaction
is decreasing in firm size. Gardner (2001) and Idson (1990) argue that the firm size effect
stems from the fact that worker autonomy is positively correlated with job satisfaction, and





The marginal effects from changing some of the personal characteristics effects are shown
in Table 4. Some, but not all, of the parameters are in agreement with previous results
from the literature. In our sample of graduates, women are more satisfied than men. This
is contrary to the summart Clark (1997) who reports that for highly educated individuals,
the job satisfaction gender differential (in favour of women) is insignificant. We also find job
satisfaction to be decreasing in age. The general result in the job satisfaction literature is
that job satisfaction is actually U-shaped in age (Clark and Oswald, 1996). However, the age
distribution of our sample of graduates is bi-modal, hence the negative age effect. We also
find that couples with more children are also more satisfied. Unfortunately, as was the case
with the hours effect, the variable ‘number of children’ is unlikely to be weakly exogenous,
therefore we do not place much weight on this result either.
With the exception of agriculture and physics, subject of study does not appear to be
a significant determinant of job satisfaction. Relative to ‘Medicine’ - the omitted category
- both subjects lead to graduates reporting greater levels of job satisfaction. Part of the
explanation is that these graduates have a better quality job match. Our reasoning is as
follows: certain subject choices entail a higher or lower degree of ‘occupation-specificity’
(Hamermesh, 1977) - that is, some subjects channel graduates into only one or two occupa-
tions (e.g. architecture students largely become architects). A subject-specific occupation is
more risky as (i) graduates may have realised they are not suited to the occupation and/or
(ii) the offer of job specific may be low. The more occupation-specific the subject the more
difficult a change of career is. This lack of mobility could have an effect on job satisfaction.
The evidence supports this assumption: agriculture and physics have a low specificity score
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Looking ahead, how do you think you will be financially a year from now/five years from
now?
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. This is in contrast with most of the literature where the relative
wage effect is larger than the direct wage effect. Results obtained when not instrumenting
own wage were similar and are not reproduced here.
An alternative to the Mincer approach to calculating a relative wage is to use the indi-
vidual’s wage at some point in the past. Column (2) in Table 8 presents these results, and
as expected the negative coefficient on 1991 wages implies that the higher your wages were
in the past, the less satisfied you are now. This is in line with the results in Easterlin (2001),
and in particular with the idea that the higher your wage in the past then the greater your
aspirations are now, and,   the more dissatisfied you are now. The coefficient
on past wage is of similar order as the expected pay one but statistically significant. The past
measure of the wage accounts for some individual fixed effects so a better fit was expected;




The model of job satisfaction as   (Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 1997)
is one of the few specifications that actually considers how wages at different points in time
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Table 1 Wages: marginal effects on probability of being satisfied 
 with the job (uncorrected for endogeneity) 
 ∆Dissatisfied ∆Neutral ∆ Satisfied 
Increase wages by £2500 -0.63% -1.81% +2.44% 
Increase wages by £5000 -0.91% -2.61% +3.50% 
Increase wages by £10000 -1.31% -4.02% +5.32% 
Notes: Dissatisfied = (1,2), neutral = (3,4), satisfied = (4,5) 
 
Table 2a Wages: marginal effects on probability of being satisfied 
 with the job (corrected for endogeneity) 
 ∆Dissatisfied ∆Neutral ∆ Satisfied 
Increase wages by £2500 -1.71% -4.76% +6.47% 
Increase wages by £5000 -2.32% -6.89% +9.21% 
Increase wages by £10000 -3.22% -10.69% +13.90% 
Notes: See notes for Table 1. 
 
Table 2a Wage effects controlling for occupation 
Wage instrumented No No Yes Yes 
Occupation controls No Yes (2-digit) 
No 
Yes (2-digit) 
Increase wages by £10000 0.336 0.303 0.797 0.636 
Z-statistics 6.290 4.660 3.720 2.485 
Notes: See notes for Table 1. 
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Table 3 Job characteristics: marginal effects 
 ∆Dissatisfied ∆Neutral ∆ Satisfied 




Double months unemployed +0.29% +0.80% -1.09% 
Increase working day by one 
hour 
+0.92% +2.38% -3.30% 
Firm size: <25 to 25-99 +2.85% +5.29% -8.13% 
Firm size: <25 to 100-499 +4.16% +7.01% -11.16% 
Firm size: <25 to >499 +3.58% +6.29% -9.88% 
Notes: Number of months unemployed between graduation and 1996 is censored at 132 
(72) months for 1985 (1990) graduates. 
 
Table 4 Personal characteristics: marginal effects (corrected for 
 endogeneity) 
 ∆Dissatisfied ∆Neutral ∆ Satisfied 
Gender effect: female to male +1.18% +3.05% -4.22% 
Increase age by ten years +0.84% +1.84% -2.68% 
Add one extra child -0.70% -1.75% +2.45% 
Subjects: medicine to agriculture -3.13% -13.08% +16.22% 
Subjects: medicine to physics -0.54% -1.60% +2.14% 
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Table 5 Basic models of job satisfaction 
 (1) Ordered Probit (2) Ordered probit (AGLS) 
 Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Current job characteristics (1996)     
Log annual pay  0.302a 4.660 0.797a 3.720 
Log weekly hours -0.236a -3.160 -0.376a -2.420 
Professional job   0.019 0.400 -0.025 -0.470 
Clerical job   -0.391a -3.600 -0.225b -1.670 
Sales job   0.113 1.140 0.145 1.360 
Public sector job   -0.111a -2.900 -0.056 -1.070 
Managerial job   0.078 1.400 0.041 0.680 
25-99 people  the workplace -0.183a -3.430 -0.205a -3.810 
100-499 people  the workplace -0.238a -4.380 -0.282a -4.630 
500 or more  the workplace -0.183a -3.750 -0.249a -3.830 
Employment History      
Months Employed -0.002 -0.450 -0.004 -0.980 
Months Employed^2 0.000 0.180 0.001 0.350 
Months unemployed -0.021a -4.430 -0.013a -1.970 
Months unemployed^2 0.000a 3.760 0.000a 1.880 
Personal Characteristics     
Age -0.006b -1.680 -0.007a -2.160 
Male -0.104a -2.820 -0.157a -3.140 
Number of children 0.066a 3.210 0.061a 3.040 
Qualification Characteristics     
Undergraduate degree -0.010 -0.170 -0.034 -0.540 
Postgraduate degree 0.037 0.520 0.005 0.080 
Old' university qualification 0.009 0.210 -0.058 -1.140 
First class honours 0.222a 3.410 0.161a 2.030 
Second class honours  0.014 0.380 -0.012 -0.280 
Background characteristics     
Grammar School 0.010 0.170 -0.032 -0.720 
Fee Paying school 0.047 1.000 0.024 0.480 
Lived in a council house at aged 14 -0.030 -0.650 -0.004 -0.060 
    
Smith-Blundell test for weak exogeneityc   0.289a 6.230 
Pseudo R^2 0.017 0.017 
N 4565 4565 
Log likelihood -6776.0 -6776.6 
Notes: Dummies, for region and subject studied are also included in the estimation.  Z-statistics are in italics. a. 
Significant at 5% level or better. b. Significant at 10% level. c. The omitted characteristics include: having a 
diploma qualification, whether or not your subject of study was a medical subject, having lower than an upper 
second class degree/diploma qualification, and whether or not you went to a comprehensive school. 
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Table 6 Reduced form wage equation 
Dependent variable:  ln(annual pay) Coefficient t-statistic 
Spouse’s characteristics   
Annual pay 0.088 8.470 
Qualification characteristics   
‘Traditional’ University 0.094 7.660 
First class honour 0.088 3.790 
Upper second honour 0.042 3.390 
Undergraduate degree 0.050 2.600 
Postgraduate degree 0.059 2.720 
Biology -0.164 -6.340 
Agriculture -0.327 -7.840 
Physics -0.115 -4.760 
Maths -0.019 -0.700 
Engineers -0.117 -4.830 
Architecture -0.218 -6.510 
Social Science -0.075 -3.330 
Business and Administrative Studies -0.082 -3.430 
Languages -0.169 -6.480 
Education -0.106 -4.190 
Humanities -0.216 -8.410 
Personal characteristics   
Age 0.000 0.250 
Male 0.117 9.640 
Number of children 0.012 1.780 
Employment history   
Months employed 0.004 3.590 
(Months employed)^2 -0.001 -0.970 
Months unemployed -0.014 -9.560 
(Months unemployed)^2 0.0001 6.850 
Job characteristics   
Professional 0.078 5.330 
Clerical Job -0.323 -9.670 
Sales Job -0.051 -1.510 
Public Sector -0.101 -8.350 
Managerial job 0.066 3.790 
25-99 people the workplace 0.042 2.560 
100-499 people the workplace 0.084 5.000 
500 or more the workplace 0.128 8.500 
Permanent job 0.079 4.570 
Background characteristics   
Lived in council house aged 14 0.025 1.410 
Went to grammar school 0.006 0.410 
Went to fee paying school 0.036 2.310 






Table 7 Instrument Validity 
Dependent variable:  ln(spouse’s salary) 
  Coefficient t-statistic 
Spouse’s characteristics  
Spouse has degree 0.260 15.370 
Spouse works part-time -0.299 -6.410 
Respondent's Characteristics  
First class degree -0.005 -0.140 
Ln(1996 pay) 0.237 10.400 
Mobile dummy  0.011 0.650 
Clerical job  0.014 0.300 
Public sector job -0.028 -1.300 
25-99 People in the workplace -0.024 -0.890 
100-499 People in the workplace 0.017 0.630 
500 People or more in the workplace 0.010 0.390 
Permanent job 0.022 0.780 
Months unemployed -0.004 -1.850 
Age  0.009 5.470 
Number of children 0.032 2.510 
Agriculture degree -0.073 -0.930 
Constant 7.539 30.810 
   
R-squared 0.136 
Observations 4565 
Notes:  The ‘mobile dummy’ is defined as being equal to one if the graduate lives in a different region to 
the one he/she lived in when he/she was first employed after gaining his/her diploma or degree.  Except for 
those variables grouped under Spouse’s characteristics all of the above variables are significant in the job 
satisfaction equation.  
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Table 8 Extended models:  posterior choice 
Dependent variable is job 
satisfaction 
 
(1) (2)a (3) 
Variable 
 
Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat 
Log annual pay (1996) ( 1θ ) 0.80 3.44 0.88 3.31 0.68 2.43 
Expected pay (1996)  -0.22 -0.96     
Log annual pay (1991) ( 2θ )   -0.24 -2.47 -0.17 -1.76 
One Year Ago        
Better off than now      Omitted Omitted 
Worse off than now ( 1λ )     0.21 2.98 
About the same ( 2λ )     0.16 2.69 
One year from now        
Better off than now      Omitted Omitted 
Worse off than now ( 3λ )     -0.48 -6.76 
About the same ( 4λ )     -0.17 -4.24 
Don’t know ( 5λ )     -0.62 -6.23 
Five years from now        
Better off than now      Omitted Omitted 
Worse off than now ( 6λ )     -0.41 -5.95 
About the same ( 7λ )     -0.15 -2.91 
Don’t know ( 8λ )     -0.27 -5.13 
Smith-Blundell 
Exogeneity test    0.33 6.62 0.28 5.66 
N  4565 4565 4565 
Log likelihood  -6776.5 -6764.1 -6636.7 
LR-test  
Chi2[] distribution, 
with  degrees of 
freedom 
  








Test (3) against ‘basic’ 
model:   
Chi2[17]=279.8b 
Test (3) against (2): 
Chi2[8]=127.4b  
Notes:  (a). Specification (2) also includes controls for job status in 1991. This controls for whether the 
graduates were part-time or full-time, undertaking further study while working, self-employed or 
employed, working from home, etc. The inclusion of these controls accounts for the 9 degrees of freedom 
attributed to the Chi2 statistic in the final row of Table 4. The overall results, including the results from 
the LR test are robust to inclusion or exclusion of these controls. (b). The results from the Likelihood 
ratio test imply that we cannot reject the unconstrained model in favour of the constrained one, i.e. the 
parameters included in the extended models (2) and (3) are jointly significant. 
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 Table A1 Distribution of answers to questions (asked in 1996) about  
 respondent’s financial situation in the past (1995) and  
 future (1997 and 2001) 
 
Sample, year (T) 
Expectation/evaluation of financial situation in year T relative 
to present period, 1996 
Full Sample Better off Worse off About same Don’t know 
T=1995 9 53 38 --- 
T=1997 47 7 43 3 
T=2001 67 6 14 13 
Female, 1985 qualification     
T=1995 9 46 45 --- 
T=1997 36 9 51 4 
T=2001 56 8 19 17 
Female, 1990 qualification     
T=1995 10 53 37 --- 
T=1997 46 8 44 3 
T=2001 63 8 14 14 
Male, 1985 qualification     
T=1995 10 51 39 --- 
T=1997 48 6 42 3 
T=2001 68 6 15 11 
Male, 1990 qualification     
T=1995 8 59 33 --- 
T=1997 55 6 38 2 
T=2001 78 4 8 9 
Notes:  The numbers in the table are interpreted as follows:  9% of female respondents from the 1985 
cohort thought they were better off in the previous year than now (1996), 36% of the same group 
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